The oil agreement between the United States and Venezuela cannot be viewed solely through the lens of oil barrels, investments, or potential revenue for Caracas.
This pact also underscores the evolving nature of the relationship between Washington and the interim government led by Delcy Rodríguez.
Since the beginning of the year, the Trump administration has consistently stated its ultimate goal of achieving a democratic Venezuela. However, the strategy has largely involved engaging with those who currently hold state power: Delcy Rodríguez and the faction of Chavismo that remains entrenched in the institutional apparatus.
Meanwhile, leaders who have historically represented the main electoral alternative to Maduro's regime have seen their roles significantly diminished.
One notable example is María Corina Machado, who held meetings with Donald Trump at the White House and later with Marco Rubio. Similarly, Edmundo González retains support from U.S. lawmakers who argue that the opposition won the 2024 elections. Despite this, neither is part of the core negotiation mechanism Washington has established with Caracas.
The U.S. Strategy: Working with Power Holders
On the other hand, Delcy Rodríguez has become a regular interlocutor for the White House, engaging in direct negotiations with the U.S. on sensitive issues such as oil, security, public revenue, sanctions, and reconstruction.
This contrast highlights the true political context of the oil agreement, with Washington opting to first engage with those who control the state.
The rationale behind this U.S. decision is straightforward. Following the capture of Nicolás Maduro, the U.S. found itself in a paradoxical situation: the political structure that had supported the old regime continued to control a substantial portion of the institutions, the Armed Forces, and the security apparatus.
In January, Rubio explained to the Senate that the individuals wielding arms and controlling institutions were essentially the same elements from the previous regime. He argued that the U.S. needed to navigate this reality to prevent the collapse of the state and subsequently lead to a transition.
Political Ramifications of the Oil Deal
The strategy made sense, as a transition cannot be executed on the ruins of an incapable state. Yet, it came with a well-known vulnerability: the indispensable interlocutor needed to stabilize the country might also become the actor with the greatest influence over the transition.
In the initial months, Washington chose to manage this contradiction through cooperation.
The relationship reached such a degree that the administration lifted sanctions on Delcy Rodríguez—a decision criticized by senators who reminded that she was part of Maduro's power core and was sanctioned for her role in the authoritarian apparatus.
Senators Jeanne Shaheen and Elizabeth Warren demanded a thorough explanation from Rubio and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent for this decision.
Their essential question was this: what specific changes justified rewarding a figure from the old regime with sanction relief?
The Role of the Opposition in Negotiations
This question gained more relevance as political negotiations progressed.
The issue is not that Washington is talking with Delcy. Engaging with an interim government that controls the state is not inherently an illegitimate concession.
Rather, the issue lies in the role this engagement plays concerning the democratic objective professed by the Trump administration.
In August, the first formal talks between the government and the opposition occurred between Jorge Rodríguez, Delcy's brother and the primary negotiator for the executive, and Dinorah Figuera, former president of the National Assembly elected in 2015 and leader of Primero Justicia.
María Corina Machado and Edmundo González were excluded from this mechanism.
Chatham House expressed concern over the structure of these conversations, noting that the initial meeting was not held in person and that subsequent statements were too vague to demonstrate substantial progress toward a transition.
From a pragmatic standpoint, the decision might make sense: a negotiation requires interlocutors capable of sitting with the opponent and seeking agreements.
However, it also carries a clear political consequence: the actors involved in negotiations are the ones shaping the new power balance.
Trump's Continued Engagement with Machado
Despite this, Machado remains a significant figure for Washington, although she is less involved in the negotiating table. Trump has not severed ties with Machado, nor has Rubio.
The opposition leader met with the Secretary of State and continues to describe her relationship with the administration positively. The issue is not one of rupture.
The issue is centrality.
Machado is not participating in the negotiations defining Venezuela's immediate political structure. Nor is González. Both have stated they will evaluate the process based on its outcomes and have demanded concrete conditions: the release of political prisoners, guarantees for all actors, institutional restoration, and an electoral calendar.
This places Washington in a delicate position. The administration needs Delcy's cooperation to govern the present while ensuring the opposition has enough influence to shape the future.
If the first relationship deepens significantly more than the second, there is a risk that the transition acquires an institutional bias before Venezuelans can express their voices in elections.
Congress's Concerns Over Stabilization vs. Transition
This concern is not exclusive to Democrats.
On August 4, Ted Cruz and Jeanne Shaheen introduced a bipartisan resolution on Venezuela demanding free and fair elections, the release of all political prisoners, and guarantees for María Corina Machado and other leaders to return and participate freely.
The resolution's co-sponsors include both Republicans and Democrats: Rick Scott, Dick Durbin, Tim Kaine, Adam Schiff, and Jacky Rosen.
Brian Mast, the Republican chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, had requested days earlier that the negotiations result in a clear path toward free and fair elections.
In essence, there is a widespread concern in Congress: stabilization may be necessary, but it cannot replace the transition.
This is also the underlying issue of the oil agreement.
The Economic Impact of Oil on Political Strategy
Until now, Washington primarily needed Delcy for a political reason: she controlled the Venezuelan state.
Now, there is a second reason: the oil agreement creates an economic relationship of enormous scale.
The Trump administration has announced a potential investment of up to $100 billion, the development of 17 fields, and American rights over part of the production. The agreement is structured around North American Blue Energy Partners and entrepreneur Alejandro Betancourt, while doubts persist over some of its legal and financial terms.
This means Washington now has long-term material interests tied to the functioning of the Venezuelan state and the stability of the structures managing the oil industry.
It does not imply a desire to preserve Delcy. But it does mean stability is no longer just a political objective. It becomes an economic condition.
And when stability and transition conflict, that difference matters.
The Sequence of Risk and Strategy
Rubio initially presented his Venezuelan strategy as a three-phase process: stabilization, recovery, and transition.
The problem arises if the first two phases yield results faster than the third.
The desired sequence would be: stabilize → recover → institutionalize → hold elections.
The risk sequence would be: stabilize → recover → invest → consolidate relationships → postpone elections.
In the former, the economy paves the way for democracy. In the latter, the economy may ultimately make continuity more appealing.
This risk does not require a conspiracy. It can simply arise from incentives.
The greater the U.S. investment, the more Washington will seek predictability. The more integrated the administration is with the interim government, the higher the cost of a sudden rupture.
The longer time passes, the harder it will be to distinguish between a transitional government and a new de facto government.
Rubio's True Test
The agreement could be extraordinarily beneficial for Venezuela.
The recovery of its oil industry could generate investment, jobs, foreign currency, and infrastructure. It could also be a strategic triumph for the United States. But for Rubio, the success criterion is more demanding.
The question is not just whether Venezuela will be producing more oil in three or five years.
The question is whether, when it does, Venezuelans will have the freedom to choose who manages that wealth and under what institutions.
Because an economically recovered but politically supervised Venezuela would still have the most important part of the program announced by Rubio in January pending.
And it is worth recalling something Congress itself is demanding from the administration: free elections require much more than a date. They require released political prisoners, the freedom to organize parties, press freedom, credible electoral institutions, and security for all candidates, including Machado.
The oil agreement does not demonstrate that Washington has abandoned these goals. But it does make the question more urgent.
The deeper the economic relationship with the interim government, the greater the need to prove that Delcy Rodríguez serves as a bridge to transition rather than the center of a new political balance.
That will be the true test of Rubio's strategy. Not who controls the oil.
But who ultimately, legitimately, governs the country being rebuilt around that oil.
Key Questions on U.S.-Venezuela Oil Agreement
What is the main goal of the U.S. in its dealings with Venezuela?
The primary goal of the U.S. is to achieve a democratic transition in Venezuela while ensuring stability and economic recovery through strategic engagements, such as the oil agreement.
Why is Delcy Rodríguez a significant figure in the negotiations?
Delcy Rodríguez is significant because she controls the Venezuelan state apparatus, making her an essential interlocutor for the U.S. in matters ranging from oil agreements to broader political discussions.
What concerns does the U.S. Congress have about the oil agreement?
The U.S. Congress is concerned that stabilization efforts, such as the oil agreement, might overshadow or delay the democratic transition process, emphasizing the need for free and fair elections.
How does the oil agreement impact U.S. interests in Venezuela?
The oil agreement creates long-term economic interests for the U.S., linking American investments and stability in Venezuela's oil sector to broader geopolitical and economic strategies.