Granma's Revisionist History: A Heroic Tale of the Maleconazo Protest

In an attempt to honor the legacy of the late dictator Fidel Castro on the centenary of his birth, the Cuban state newspaper Granma has embarked on a historical revisionism exercise that reveals more about the regime's current needs than the actual events of August 5, 1994.

Fidel's "Heroic" Intervention

Under the headline 'The Example Capable of Dispelling the Darkest Omens,' the official publication portrays the then-leader as a figure who, through his mere presence and an alleged directive to "silence the weapons," managed to quell a violent crowd and avert a potential massacre.

This narrative, however convenient, does not align with the established facts.

The Reality Before Fidel Arrived

The Maleconazo did not begin with Fidel Castro. The protest erupted hours before his arrival at the intersection of Galiano and San Lázaro. Thousands had spontaneously gathered at the Malecón and downtown Havana after years of blackouts, hunger, shortages, and growing despair fueled by the Special Period.

Chants of "¡Libertad!" and "¡Abajo Fidel!" were not inspired by foreign influence or a sophisticated psychological operation. They emerged because countless Cubans had reached their breaking point.

By the time Castro arrived, the Revolutionary National Police, Ministry of the Interior (MININT) forces, and the so-called Rapid Response Brigades—including members of the Blas Roca contingent and other groups mobilized by the Communist Party—had already acted to disperse the demonstration through beatings, arrests, and force.

Misleading Narratives of "Cognitive Warfare"

One of the most striking aspects of the article is its attribution of the events to the "brutality emerged from cognitive warfare." This notion is almost laughable when applied to 1994, a time when Cuba was devoid of Facebook, X, YouTube, WhatsApp, Telegram, or smartphones. Internet access was virtually non-existent for the public. The vast majority of Cubans received information solely from state-controlled sources.

To claim "cognitive warfare" as an explanation for the Maleconazo is to ascribe a social media-driven protest to an era when the island had barely any digital connections. It’s a concept borrowed from contemporary political discourse to retrospectively reinterpret an event that had much more tangible causes: hunger, blackouts, inflation, hopelessness, and lack of freedoms.

Dehumanizing Protesters as "Antisocial Elements"

Granma resorts to a classic tactic of official language: dehumanizing the protesters by labeling them as "antisocial elements." However, numerous testimonies, photographs, and videos from that time show a different reality: workers, youths, retirees, homemakers, and ordinary citizens publicly expressing discontent that had been building for years.

Reducing that social explosion to a handful of criminals is difficult to sustain even three decades later.

The Violence Ignored by Granma

The article mentions an injured member of the Blas Roca contingent but omits any reference to the violence exerted by state forces. It fails to acknowledge the mass arrests, the beatings reported by numerous witnesses, or the summary trials that followed.

It also neglects to mention that just days later, the regime opened maritime exits, leading to the balseros crisis—a decision hard to explain if everything had been reduced to a small group of "antisocials" manipulated from abroad.

If the problem was merely a few provocateurs, why did tens of thousands of Cubans seize the opportunity to leave the country?

Reflecting on the Present

Perhaps more revealing is what the article says about 2026 rather than 1994. Granma insists on depicting popular discontent as exclusively the product of an external conspiracy, echoing the argument used after the protests of July 11, 2021.

Yet, there is an evident thread connecting the Maleconazo and the 11J: economic crisis, shortages, deteriorating services, power outages, and social frustration. Circumstances may change, but the discontent remains.

Fidel vs. Díaz-Canel: A Tale of Leadership

The article constructs an image of Fidel Castro as a leader who prevented bloodshed by ordering his escorts to lower their weapons. Even accepting this version, it inevitably draws an uncomfortable comparison with the conduct of the current Cuban leader during the 11J protests.

While Granma extols Fidel's supposed calmness in 1994, on July 11, 2021, Miguel Díaz-Canel appeared on national television to issue his infamous call: "The order of combat is given," urging government supporters to violently confront the demonstrators.

That declaration was followed by a massive mobilization of police, military, and pro-government groups, along with hundreds of arrests and subsequent long prison sentences.

The comparison does not reflect well on the leader appointed by Raúl Castro. If Granma claims that Fidel's "greatness" lay in avoiding lethal force and opting for restraint, is it implicitly suggesting that Díaz-Canel acted with less authority, less political control, or less crisis management capability?

This interpretation is hard to avoid.

A Story Unadorned by Propaganda

The Maleconazo was the largest protest against the Cuban government since 1959 until the 11J. It was neither a laboratory operation nor a battle of non-existent algorithms. It was a public expression of an economic and social crisis that the state itself recognized at the time as the worst since the so-called "revolution" triumphed.

Thirty-two years later, the persistent attempts by the official press to reinterpret those events with contemporary concepts and providential heroes seem less driven by a desire to explain history than by a need to control its memory.

When a regime repeatedly rewrites the past, it often indicates that the present is no longer sufficient to persuade.