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Spanish Scholar Analyzes Cuban Regime: Institutionalized Control and Political Stagnation Amidst Repression

Friday, July 17, 2026 by Samantha Mendoza

Spanish Scholar Analyzes Cuban Regime: Institutionalized Control and Political Stagnation Amidst Repression
Raúl Castro, Miguel Díaz-Canel, and the Cuban generals at the head of the FAR and the MININT - Image from © FB/Presidencia Cuba

According to Spanish scholar Francisco Sánchez López, the Cuban regime's stability is not rooted in Fidel Castro's charisma, ideological uniqueness, or external factors such as the U.S. embargo. Instead, it is anchored in the cohesion of a highly institutionalized ruling elite. This is the central thesis of Sánchez López's analysis, published on July 15 in CubaxCuba, under the title "Elites, Continuity, and Political Change in Cuba." Sánchez López is a professor and director of the Instituto de Iberoamérica at the University of Salamanca.

Sánchez López begins his analysis by addressing a largely unexplained phenomenon: the Cuban political system's ability to endure generational changes, constitutional reforms, profound economic crises, and the physical disappearance of its historical leadership without any of these factors disrupting the core of power.

The Crucial Question: Surviving Beyond Castro

The key question, according to Sánchez López, isn't why Fidel Castro remained in power for so long, but rather, "Why did the system survive beyond Fidel?"

The answer lies in three structural pillars: the Communist Party of Cuba, the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), and a technocratic bureaucracy that replaced the old revolutionary guard without causing internal fractures.

Political Machinery and Social Mobility

The Communist Party functions as more than just an ideological organization. "Being part of the political environment organized around the party doesn't merely represent ideological affiliation. It also means access to opportunities, administrative careers, institutional recognition, and mobility within the state apparatus," the analysis notes. This social mobility mechanism serves as an extraordinarily effective loyalty tool.

The FAR plays a crucial role that extends beyond being a coercive apparatus. Their involvement in the Cuban economy is significant: "It's not just about military control over coercive means, but an interplay between security, economy, and politics that boosts the system's adaptive capacity." The military business conglomerate GAESA controls between 40% and 70% of Cuba's GDP and 95% of foreign currency transactions in the country.

Technocratic Bureaucracy and Controlled Change

The third pillar is the technocratic bureaucracy. Sánchez López describes how the regime transitioned from an elite of revolutionary fighters to cadres trained within the state apparatus itself, with "predictable career paths and selection mechanisms combining technical competence and political reliability." This generational renewal occurred without political opening or internal fracture.

This framework also clarifies why the regime's announced reforms do not lead to real openness. "It's not about an absence of change but controlled change," writes Sánchez López. In highly institutionalized regimes, reforms can reinforce control and redistribute responsibilities without altering essential hierarchies. The 176 economic measures presented by Miguel Díaz-Canel in June 2026, analysts suggest, follow this same logic.

Legitimacy Shift and Enduring Repression

The analysis also explores the transformation of the regime's legitimacy. The revolutionary narrative and anti-imperialism that united previous generations have eroded, especially among those who did not live through 1959. However, this erosion hasn't destabilized the system because its legitimacy is no longer charismatic; it is bureaucratic, Sánchez López concludes.

Within this context, repression emerges as a structural component. The regime, Sánchez López notes, "has survived with low levels of active support due to institutional control, organizational capacity, and the absence of effective political alternatives, achieved through high levels of repression." Data supports this view: as of June 2026, Cuba has a record 1,306 political prisoners according to Prisoners Defenders, including 40 minors and 338 individuals imprisoned directly for the July 11, 2021 protests.

"Political systems don't necessarily change when their visible faces change. They change when the structures supporting power fracture," Sánchez López concludes, cautioning that "it's very easy to make mistakes when discussing Cuba due to the lack of information and transparency inherent to dictatorships."

Understanding the Cuban Regime's Endurance

What are the key pillars supporting the Cuban regime?

The key pillars are the Communist Party of Cuba, the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), and a technocratic bureaucracy that ensures continuity without internal fractures.

How does the Communist Party contribute to regime stability?

The Communist Party acts as a mechanism for social mobility, providing access to opportunities and institutional recognition, thereby ensuring loyalty and stability.

Why haven't announced reforms led to real political openness?

The announced reforms are part of a controlled change strategy that reinforces control and reshuffles responsibilities without altering core hierarchies.

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