Cuba's Economic Measures: Strategic Shift or Diplomatic Ploy?

Economist Elías Amor raises a question that has sparked debate among those who study the Cuban landscape: are the 176 economic measures approved by the National Assembly on June 19 a genuine sign of transition or simply a diplomatic maneuver aimed at Washington?

"These measures are essentially the bargaining chips laid out in negotiations with the United States to see if they provoke any movement or have any impact," Amor stated during the final installment of his analysis series on the reform package, alongside journalist Tania Costa.

After delving into speeches by Díaz-Canel and Marrero regarding the set of 176 measures, Amor identified an emerging internal split within the regime that has become apparent since the reforms were announced.

"Within the supposed unity of the communist regime, reformist and reactionary factions have emerged. The latter are unwilling to change and insist that these reforms are only valid if they respect the Constitution, the communist system, and Cuba's socialist nature," he explained.

This internal tension is particularly evident in the analysis of thematic axis 15, which focuses on foreign trade and encompasses measures 127 to 130.

Amor sees the stated goal of increasing Cuban exports as positive but criticizes the backward logic. "For an economy to export, it must first meet the basic needs of its citizens, ensuring they have enough to eat."

Although the measures remove mandatory state intermediaries and allow private entities to export directly, Amor points out that progress is limited: direct exports still require prior approval from the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment.

"In Cuba, you need approval from Fidel Castro's nephew at the Ministry of Foreign Trade. They open doors, but that discretionary criterion persists," Amor remarked sarcastically.

For the analyst, the distinction between authorization and license is not a trivial technicality but rather the core of Cuba's structural economic problem.

"Ideally, no authorization would be needed, just a license, as is the case in countries like Spain, France, and Germany. In Spain, you aren't authorized; you export, but you must have an export license," he noted.

This state-driven discretionary approach, in his opinion, is the fundamental reason why the Cuban economy cannot function effectively, aside from the lack of private property.

The analysis takes place amid a severe crisis: the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) projects a 6.5% decline in Cuba's GDP by 2026, the worst in Latin America, while the fiscal deficit exceeds 12% of GDP, financed by monetary issuance.

Amor doesn't mince words in his assessment of Díaz-Canel's government: "This government is not only ineffective but does absolutely nothing. They focus solely on complaining about the blockade and embargo. Work, do something," he urged.

Regarding the actual feasibility of the reform package, the economist remains skeptical. "If these measures were implemented, they would take up a lot of time. Let's see if they can manage to do it."

Amor, who predicted in April 2026 that Cuba would be free before the summer, remains optimistic about an imminent transition. However, he acknowledges that the regime will only implement measures that do not threaten the communist structure, and genuine change would require amending the constitutional articles underpinning the state model.