The Cuban Human Rights Observatory (OCDH) hosted a significant discussion in Madrid this Tuesday titled "Restoring Judicial Independence in Cuba." The event brought together former judges, ex-prosecutors, and lawyers to highlight the structural subordination of Cuba's judicial system to the Communist Party and State Security.
Presented by Teresa Larrinaga, president of the OCDH, the meeting featured contributions from Yaxys Cires, the organization's Strategy Director, and Maylín Fernández Suris, a law graduate and former Cuban judge. Additionally, José F. Chofre Sirvent, a law professor from the University of Alicante, participated online.
"It's unacceptable to start a new republic with judges involved in repression," stated Cires, advocating for "an extensive audit of the judicial power from top to bottom, replacing personnel where needed and selecting judges not implicated in political cases or rights violations."
Cires further emphasized the necessity of reestablishing the separation of powers, stating, "We must revive Montesquieu's principles. It's crucial for the Cuba we aim to build to have independent branches: legislative, executive, and judicial. There can be no rights without justice."
During the discussion, Maylín Fernández Suris presented a report titled "The Absence of Judicial Independence in Cuba: Formal and Practical Elements." The report concludes that the issue stems not from isolated failures but from a deliberate institutional design that subordinates courts to political power.
The document highlights that judicial careers in Cuba are not based on professional merit but on ideological loyalty. It also points out that Decree-Law 13 of 2020 allows secret and binding verifications by State Security on public office aspirants, with no possibility of appeal.
Two former Cuban judges testified about receiving "direct instructions from the President of the Supreme Court, aligning with the interests of the Communist Party of Cuba and the Ministry of the Interior." One of them explained, "Judges were required to report on decisions made and were instructed on how to proceed in these cases," adding that judicial careers depended solely on how well a judge met the Communist Party's expectations.
The report also documents daily surveillance by State Security over judges' personal and professional lives, alongside patterns of hindering defense rights, abusive use of pretrial detention, severe penalties in political cases, and reprisals against lawyers.
This situation reflects years of mass trials against demonstrators and over 1,250 political prisoners documented in Cuba by the NGO Prisoners Defenders.
Cires outlined a strategy based on three pillars: legal independence and framework, evaluation and cleansing—or lustration—and system renewal and efficiency. He suggested forming a commission of esteemed jurists and civil society actors to conduct a thorough review of current judges and candidates, based on criteria excluding those involved in repression or with ties to organized crime.
He proposed retaining individuals who have worked in civil, family, or labor sectors without political involvement and inviting Cuban law graduates living abroad to bolster the system during the transition.
"The transition must avoid two risks: the collapse of the judicial system and the unnecessary judicialization of transitional issues. Not every conflict needs to reach the courts," Cires warned, emphasizing that rebuilding judicial independence is vital for any democratic transition process in Cuba.
Key Questions on Judicial Independence in Cuba
Why is restoring judicial independence in Cuba important?
Restoring judicial independence is crucial for ensuring a fair and unbiased legal system, which is foundational for a democratic society. It prevents the judiciary from being influenced by political powers, thus safeguarding citizens' rights and freedoms.
What are the main challenges to achieving judicial independence in Cuba?
The main challenges include the entrenched relationship between the judiciary and the Communist Party, lack of merit-based appointments, and State Security's influence over judicial processes. Overcoming these requires systemic reforms and international support.