When Jeremy Lewin stated, "the regime must return these resources to the Cuban people," it seemed to introduce a rare consideration into the discourse surrounding Cuba: the potential for an international effort to reclaim assets linked to GAESA and the regime's military elite.
Although the scenario outlined by the Deputy Secretary of State for Foreign Assistance, Humanitarian Affairs, and Religious Freedom—who is also a key advisor to Secretary Marco Rubio—is still hypothetical, it wouldn't be an unprecedented event in the realm of international politics.
In recent decades, governments, multilateral organizations, and judicial systems have crafted specific mechanisms to trace, freeze, and eventually recover fortunes tied to authoritarian regimes, state corruption, or money laundering networks.
International experience, however, reveals that these processes are often far more intricate than they seem.
Steps to Identify and Recover Assets
The initial phase typically involves identifying and isolating assets. This encompasses bank accounts, shell companies, real estate, investment funds, and corporate shares scattered across various jurisdictions.
Achieving this requires international financial cooperation, access to banking intelligence, and legal frameworks that justify preventive measures.
One of the most significant tools created in recent decades is the Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR), spearheaded by the World Bank and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). This program is specifically designed to aid in tracking fortunes illicitly extracted from countries through corruption or abuse of power.
Challenges of Asset Redistribution
Yet, freezing funds is a far cry from successfully returning them to their country of origin. The Libyan example illustrates this challenge well. After the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, the UN Security Council froze more than $34 billion linked to the Libyan regime. A significant portion of these assets remained immobilized in foreign banks for years while various political factions contested their legitimacy.
The international community uncovered a recurring issue: when a regime collapses, there isn't always an immediate consensus on who legally represents the state.
Precedents and Implications for Cuba
Iraq offers another precedent, even more pertinent to Cuba. Following the 2003 invasion and the fall of Saddam Hussein, the U.S. and international bodies established the Development Fund for Iraq to manage oil revenues and recovered assets for institutional rebuilding, public salaries, and the new state's basic operations.
More than Iraq or Libya, Cuba might find a closer precedent in Venezuela, where frozen assets, oil revenues, and external resources began to be managed through hybrid schemes of international oversight and conditioned financial control.
The Venezuelan experience shows that modern sanctions aim not just to punish governments but also to control who manages strategic resources and under what political legitimacy they are used.
Complexities in Asset Recovery
Eastern Europe also provided important lessons. After the fall of Nicolae Ceaușescu in Romania and the collapse of other Communist regimes, numerous governments attempted to trace hidden funds and properties controlled by former elites.
However, in the post-communist European landscape, results were mixed. In many instances, a substantial part of the assets vanished before legal recovery mechanisms could be activated.
The experience highlighted another central issue: dictatorships seldom concentrate their wealth under easily identifiable names. They use business networks, front men, tax havens, and complex financial structures designed specifically to complicate tracking.
That's why the current offensive against GAESA seems to focus on foreign financial entities and international operators. The U.S. strategy wouldn't just pressure the Cuban military conglomerate but also dissuade any collaboration with its global financial structures.
Secondary sanctions play a crucial role in this architecture. They function as a form of indirect coercion, forcing banks, shipping companies, and foreign businesses to choose between maintaining relations with sanctioned entities or preserving access to the U.S. financial system.
In recent years, this tool has become one of Washington's most powerful means to isolate state actors deemed hostile.
Political and Legal Hurdles
However, even if assets linked to GAESA could be identified and frozen, enormous legal and political obstacles would arise.
Under what legal framework could they be confiscated? Who would manage these resources? Which government would be internationally recognized as the legitimate recipient? How could it be ensured that the funds wouldn't end up ensnared again by corruption networks?
Recent history shows there are no simple answers.
In some countries, recovered assets were partially used for institutional reconstruction. In others, they remained entangled in international litigation for years. There are also cases where disputes over control of these funds exacerbated internal conflicts and power struggles.
That's precisely why Lewin's statement carries such political weight. It introduces a logic that goes beyond conventional sanctions and approaches the realm of state transitions: the idea that wealth accumulated by a power structure could become a subject of national restitution.
The major question is no longer just whether there are sufficient assets abroad, but what would happen to them in a potential political change scenario in Cuba.
And this question inevitably leads to an even more sensitive one: if these resources were ever recovered, how could they be used to fund a "day after"?
Reclaiming Cuban Assets: Key Questions and Answers
What is the Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR)?
The Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR) is a program launched by the World Bank and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to help trace and recover fortunes illicitly taken from countries through corruption or abuse of power.
What challenges exist in reclaiming assets from dictatorial regimes?
Reclaiming assets from dictatorial regimes involves complex challenges, including identifying and isolating assets, establishing legal frameworks for confiscation, and determining legitimate management and distribution in the event of a regime change.
How have secondary sanctions been used in asset recovery efforts?
Secondary sanctions serve as indirect pressure on banks, shipping companies, and foreign businesses, forcing them to choose between dealing with sanctioned entities or maintaining access to the U.S. financial system, thus isolating hostile state actors.