Cuba's inability to replicate the economic paths of China or Vietnam stems from factors far beyond the U.S. embargo; these are deeply rooted in cultural, structural, and especially political differences.
This analysis follows Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel's first interview on U.S. television, aired last Sunday on NBC News' "Meet the Press." During the segment, Díaz-Canel claimed the primary distinction between Cuba and the Asian giant lies in the length of the U.S. embargo.
While China and Vietnam also faced U.S. sanctions, their duration was limited to a mere decade. In contrast, Cuba has endured over six decades under the embargo, Díaz-Canel argued. However, economists and political analysts suggest the true explanation lies elsewhere.
A Cultural Mismatch
"Cuba hasn't adopted the Chinese-Vietnamese model because Cubans are not Chinese," is an admission reflecting the system's own limitations.
The cultural argument surfaces early in discussions on this topic. The Chinese Communist Party is essentially a modern evolution of the ancient mandarinate system, rooted in hierarchy and obedience.
"The current Communist Party is essentially what the mandarins were... just transformed. It's ingrained in their culture. We've never been like that," the analysis points out.
Conversely, Cuban culture operates under a different ethos. "We are more laid-back, more liberal in every sense. No matter how conservative we might be in some areas, we're still more liberal. It's just not feasible," concludes the analysis on the potential for adopting such a model in Cuba.
Structural Barriers to Economic Transformation
Beyond culture, structural limitations play a critical role: scale. China's vast resources allow it to craft its own economic logic and extend its influence worldwide. In contrast, Cuba lacks the critical mass in population, resources, and productive capacity that enabled China and Vietnam to withstand the shocks of reform.
The Cuban regime understands this, opting for a different path: rent-seeking. "They've always known that without a different economic dynamic, prosperity wasn't possible. So they chose a rentier economy to avoid granting autonomy that could politically weaken them," explains the analysis.
The strategy was straightforward and destructive: "I provide the Soviet Union with political services, and they give me money. I offer advice to Chávez, and they give me oil. That's rent-seeking."
This model allowed the regime to avoid genuine reform for decades, but it has an expiration date. The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, and Venezuelan support dwindled since 2019. Today, Cuba lacks a new benefactor to sustain its stagnation.
Internal Dynamics and Potential Shifts
Within the system, however, not everyone shares the same perspective. When Fidel Castro rejected economic reform at the 1982 Congress, the Armed Forces began building their own economic apparatus, now embodied in GAESA, the military conglomerate controlling tourism, retail, and banking, with assets estimated at over $18 billion.
"For the Armed Forces, control is linked to prosperity. But for the party, if sacrificing prosperity is necessary to maintain control, then it will be sacrificed. These are two different sensitivities," the analysis notes.
This divergence raises a question: could there be figures within the Cuban military willing to support a transition? The analysis doesn't confirm this, but neither does it rule it out, indicating that these differing sensitivities have existed for decades.
The debate gains significance in the current context. In March 2026, Díaz-Canel promised a Cuban economic model "better than China's," combining centralized planning with market elements, yet without deep structural reforms.
Roberto Veiga, a jurist and political analyst and director of Cuba Próxima, noted that these statements are part of ongoing negotiations between Havana and Washington, although the regime hasn't abandoned its red lines.
Meanwhile, Cuba's private sector makes up only about 20-30% of the economy, compared to 60% in China, according to World Bank data.
Understanding Cuba's Economic Challenges
Why can't Cuba follow the Chinese model?
Cuba struggles to follow the Chinese model due to cultural differences, structural limitations, and political decisions that prevent it from embracing necessary reforms.
What is the role of the Cuban Armed Forces in the economy?
The Cuban Armed Forces have established their economic empire through GAESA, controlling significant sectors like tourism and retail, reflecting a distinct approach to maintaining control and prosperity.
How does the Cuban regime maintain its economic model?
The regime sustains its economic model through rent-seeking strategies, historically relying on external support from allies like the Soviet Union and Venezuela, although such support is no longer viable.