The Cuban Ministry of the Interior (MININT) has announced that it has partially dismantled an alleged illegal currency trafficking network between the United States and Cuba. According to the authorities, this operation was orchestrated by exiled Cuban Humberto Julio Mora Caballero from Miami.
This operation, described by the regime as a "new criminal modality," occurs against a backdrop of structural crisis, liquidity shortages, and an increasing loss of state control over financial flows outside the official banking system.
An International Network Centered in Miami
Lieutenant Colonel Yisnel Rivero Crespo, head of the Economic Crimes Department at MININT, stated that Mora Caballero had established a transnational structure that, between February and September 2025, moved over 1 billion Cuban pesos and around 250,000 U.S. dollars through channels parallel to the formal financial system.
The alleged scheme involved collecting foreign currencies in the U.S., where the financier opened bank accounts under proxies' names to move money and make payments to suppliers.
Operations in Camagüey and Beyond
In Cuba, an operational base in Camagüey—fed by cash remittances from Havana and other provinces—served as a distribution point for national currency to families of Cuban expatriates. Rather than passing through official channels, the money remained "on the street," according to MININT, fueling informal economies and parallel import circuits.
Within Cuba, at least four small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) owners are under investigation, though the official source did not identify them. These SME owners reportedly used the financier's services to import supplies without using state channels, "compensating" with peso payments to their island clients.
The Emergence of the "Financier"
The Cuban government has introduced the concept of the "financier" in this case, referring to operators who collect dollars outside the island and manage their distribution in national currency within the country.
This activity arises from an undeniable reality: the collapse of Cuba’s banking system in channeling remittances and the emergence of alternative routes, many linked to the burgeoning private sector. According to the official narrative, Mora Caballero charged a dual commission: one on the remittances sent by exiled Cubans and another to SME owners needing foreign currency to sustain their businesses, due to the inability to operate through state mechanisms.
The authorities acknowledge that "the country receives less than 10% of what used to enter" in remittances through official channels. The rest circulates in parallel schemes beyond the control of institutions like FINCIMEX or state currency exchanges.
A Blow to SMEs and Increased Economic Surveillance
The case has also served as a platform for new threats from the government against the nascent private sector. Although Lieutenant Colonel Rivero Crespo claims it’s "not about attacking SMEs, which are necessary for the country," his statements in Cubadebate suggest a tightening of financial oversight, increased tax controls, and "priority" enforcement operations against structures with larger volumes of economic activity.
The official blog Razones de Cuba, managed by State Security, has begun laying the media groundwork for a possible legal or media offensive against other figures similar to Mora Caballero, even warning of social media scams that replicate similar operational patterns.
Remittances, Informal Economy, and State Control: A Crossroad
Currency trafficking through unofficial channels is not new in Cuba, but it has taken on a new dimension amid partial dollarization of the economy, rampant inflation, and the collapse of the Cuban peso.
Cuban authorities attribute these distortions to U.S. sanctions policy, which hinders Cuba's access to the international financial system. However, beyond the official rhetoric, the use of alternative means for remittance transfers addresses a concrete need for millions of Cuban families, who find no viable or reliable options within the state system.
The case of Mora Caballero and the structure he allegedly led in Miami reveals the existence of mixed financial circuits operating with entrepreneurial logic, exploiting the institutional gaps in the Cuban system and the partial opening of the private sector.
The use of large cash volumes, informal payment channels to international suppliers, and the circulation of pesos outside the fiscal system also directly affect variables like bank cash availability, the informal exchange rate, and the sustained increase in the cost of living.
"The U.S. Loses Nothing from This"
The MININT narrative insists on blaming Washington for such operations, accusing the U.S. of "financial persecution" and tolerating schemes that limit foreign currency inflow to the Cuban state. However, neither Rivero Crespo nor other officials have provided evidence of international cooperation or formal extradition requests.
"Cuban money remains circulating within Cuba while the foreign currency stays there," affirmed the lieutenant colonel in an interview with the official press. This statement, however, does not answer the key question: why do Cubans inside and outside the island prefer illegal mechanisms to send and receive money?
An Ongoing Investigation and a Model in Crisis
The 121/2025 case file is still in the preparatory phase, with more than a dozen people—including the four SME owners—under precautionary measures. According to MININT, "this is not the first time" they have faced structures led by Mora Caballero, who has allegedly been investigated before.
Beyond the specific case, the regime acknowledges the existence of other similar networks in operation, suggesting that the dismantled scheme is just a fraction of a widespread and expanding phenomenon. Meanwhile, millions of Cubans will continue to search for ways to survive and send help to their families in a country where the state financial system has become increasingly inoperative and where the line between what is legal and what is necessary becomes more blurred every day.
Understanding the Impact of Informal Currency Networks in Cuba
Why are alternative remittance channels used in Cuba?
Alternative remittance channels are used in Cuba due to the collapse of the state banking system and the lack of viable and reliable options within the official system. These channels address the concrete needs of millions of Cuban families.
What role do SME owners play in the alleged illegal currency network?
SME owners used the services of the alleged financier to import supplies without using state channels. This allowed them to sustain their businesses by compensating with peso payments to their clients on the island.
How does the regime view the informal currency network?
The regime views the informal currency network as a new criminal modality and blames it on U.S. sanctions, accusing the U.S. of financial persecution and tolerating schemes that limit foreign currency inflow to the Cuban state.