This week, Colombian Foreign Minister Rosa Villavicencio reignited the regional debate over a "negotiated exit" for Nicolás Maduro. Speaking in Madrid, she expressed Colombia's willingness to support a transitional plan that would ensure the Venezuelan dictator's personal safety in exchange for legitimate new elections.
"Maduro can leave without facing imprisonment, allowing someone capable of steering a democratic transition to take over," Villavicencio stated during a Bloomberg interview on her official visit to Spain. She emphasized this option as "the healthiest" for the nation and the region.
These remarks align with similar messages from Colombian President Gustavo Petro and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. In 2024, they stressed the importance of holding new elections in Venezuela following a widely criticized election due to fraud and exclusion of opposition candidates.
The Complexity of International Proposals
However, despite Villavicencio's renewed call, these statements represent neither a novel nor a coordinated proposal between Bogotá and Brasília. The last notable push by both governments for an electoral solution occurred before the U.S. aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford's deployment to the Caribbean, not as a reaction to that military move.
An Internal Plan within Chavismo
In tandem with Colombia and Brazil's public proposals, recent reports have surfaced about a confidential internal plan within the Venezuelan regime. Spearheaded by Delcy Rodríguez and Jorge Rodríguez, this plan involved offering the United States a transition without Maduro.
According to an investigation by the Miami Herald reported by outlets like Euronews, the Rodríguez siblings made at least two formal proposals in 2025—one in April, another in September—where Maduro would step down within three years, with Delcy assuming the presidency to complete the term until 2031.
This plan reportedly aimed to show Washington a more "palatable" version of Chavismo through intermediaries in Qatar. However, the White House explicitly rejected the offer, viewing it as a means to preserve the power structures of Chavismo, which Washington is unwilling to tolerate.
Diplomatic Gestures with Limited Success
According to analyst Martin Rodríguez, although talks for Maduro's exit might occur, the real catalyst for change will be the internal fracture within Chavismo's military and economic power, not merely diplomatic agreements.
Rodríguez argues in a recent Washington Times article that calls for a negotiated exit are belated and lack realistic foundation. "Caracas is not a conventional government; it's a criminal protection network," he writes, asserting that Maduro lacks both military cohesion and popular support to uphold an orderly transition.
In contrast to Colombia and Brazil's gradualist approach, which seeks to maintain dialogue channels to prevent humanitarian crises or open conflict, previous mediation efforts—like the Oslo dialogue and Mexico rounds—show a consistent pattern: Chavismo buys time, reorganizes its repressive apparatus, and divides the opposition.
Washington's Pressure and Caribbean Tensions
Meanwhile, Washington has increased its military presence in the Caribbean and intensified its rhetoric on Venezuela. The Trump administration reiterated its refusal to accept another sham election and maintained that "all options are on the table."
The deployment of USS Gerald R. Ford is seen by regional analysts as a direct message to Caracas, at a time when U.S. intelligence networks detect fractures in Venezuela's military leadership and unusual financial movements among Chavismo's high commanders.
In this scenario, the offers of "safe retirement" or "personal guarantees" promoted by Bogotá and Brasília lose political traction and strategic value. As Rodríguez points out, authoritarian regimes typically fall not through negotiation, but when their military base refuses to continue fighting.
"A careful sequence, targeted intelligence, and the memory of Panama will lead to collapse, not chaos," concludes the analyst, referencing the fall of Manuel Noriega in 1989.
A Ticking Clock in Caracas
The Colombian initiative seems more like a diplomatic gesture than a viable roadmap. Brazil, meanwhile, maintains an ambiguous stance: Lula continues advocating dialogue but without presenting a formal plan for new elections or exit guarantees.
However, the situation on the ground—internal corruption, distrust among leaders, and external military pressure—suggests that Maduro's regime is unraveling from within. If international pressure persists and the military elite perceives that the cost of supporting the dictator outweighs the benefits, the outcome could be swift and, as Rodríguez warns, end not in negotiation, but in flight.
Key Questions about Venezuela's Political Crisis
What is Colombia's position on Maduro's exit?
Colombia, represented by its Foreign Minister Rosa Villavicencio, supports a transitional plan ensuring Maduro's safe departure in exchange for legitimate new elections.
How has the United States responded to internal plans within Chavismo?
The U.S. has rejected proposals from within the Venezuelan regime, viewing them as means to preserve Chavismo's power structures.
Why do experts believe diplomatic efforts may not succeed?
Experts argue that the lack of military cohesion and popular support for Maduro, coupled with internal distrust within Chavismo, make diplomatic efforts unlikely to succeed.