What the Reactivation of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act Means

On January 31, 2025, President Donald Trump's new administration officially announced—via a letter sent to the relevant Congressional committees—that it is lifting the suspension on lawsuits under the Helms-Burton Act (also known as the LIBERTAD Act). In this announcement, the State Department noted that this decision reverses a last-minute move by former President Joe Biden, who, on January 14, 2025 (just six days before leaving office), had reinstated a six-month suspension on new lawsuits under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act. By withdrawing that letter, the Trump Administration once again allows new legal actions against companies or individuals allegedly "trafficking" in properties confiscated by the Cuban regime after 1959.

Background on Biden's Suspension (January 14, 2025)

Throughout most of Biden's term (2021–2025), he had not restored the semi-annual suspension of Title III, a practice that had been common from the Helms-Burton Act's enactment in 1996 until 2019. However, on January 14, 2025, Biden unexpectedly:

• Ordered a six-month suspension of new lawsuits under Title III (until June 14, 2025).
• Excluded existing cases from the suspension, allowing them to proceed normally in court.
• Removed Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism and eliminated the "restricted list" of Cuban entities subject to additional sanctions.
• Justified these actions as part of a humanitarian agreement coordinated with the Catholic Church to secure the release of political prisoners in Cuba.

Understanding Title III of the Helms-Burton Act

Title III allows U.S. citizens and companies to sue other companies (American or foreign) that use or benefit from properties expropriated in Cuba after 1959, without compensating the original owners. It had been suspended semi-annually since 1996 to avoid diplomatic tensions with U.S. allies, particularly the European Union and Canada. However, in 2019, Donald Trump lifted this suspension, leading to several lawsuits against international companies involved in the island.

The Return of Trump and the January 29 Letter

Upon taking office on January 20, 2025, for his second presidential term, Trump's team, led by newly appointed Secretary of State Marco Rubio, immediately reviewed Biden's late-term measures. Less than ten days later, on January 29, 2025, the State Department issued a letter declaring:

• The suspension of new lawsuits ordered by Biden on January 14 is annulled.
• Reactivates the ability of any American claimant alleging lost properties in Cuba to initiate legal actions immediately.

The Legal Foundation

The Helms-Burton Act itself (22 U.S.C. § 6085) permits the president to suspend or revoke the suspension of Title III at their discretion, when deemed necessary to "accelerate a democratic transition in Cuba" or for "U.S. national interests." Trump argues that fully reinstating Title III increases pressure on the Cuban regime and facilitates justice for victims of expropriations.

Implications of Lifting the Suspension

New Lawsuits

As of January 31, 2025, new lawsuits can be filed in U.S. federal courts against companies engaged in economic activities linked to confiscated properties on the island. Companies that conducted transactions in Cuba during the "brief window" of suspension (from January 14 to 29) might face future legal actions if deemed to be trafficking in expropriated properties.

Ongoing Cases

As clarified by the Act, the suspension did not affect ongoing lawsuits. These cases remained active even during Biden's suspension week and now continue under a renewed context of "full force" of Title III.

Policy Towards Cuba

The Trump Administration resumes a "maximum pressure" approach. It is anticipated that additional tightening measures, including potential travel restrictions or further limits on remittances, might be reintroduced or strengthened. Foreign investors once again face legal uncertainty, which could severely impact the island's economy, largely controlled by the Cuban regime and military forces.

Diplomatic Relations

Allied countries with substantial interests in Cuba (such as Spain and Canada) are likely to raise objections, as they did in 2019 when the first lawsuits were activated. Increased tension with the European Union is foreseeable, given their defense of their investors against what they view as an extraterritorial application of U.S. law.

Anticipated Reactions and Prospects

Trump's Team

The president and his advisors, including new National Security Advisor Mike Waltz and potential Secretary of State Marco Rubio, are known advocates of tough measures against the Cuban regime.

Cuban Exile Community

Some celebrate the return of lawsuits as a means to seek reparations for expropriated properties; others fear further damage to the island's already struggling economy, potentially exacerbating the suffering of ordinary Cubans.

Cuban Regime

It is expected that Havana will condemn the "hostile policy" and U.S. "aggression," while facing a scenario of reduced foreign investment and possible greater shortages of resources.

Summary

Biden Restored the Suspension (January 14, 2025)

• Froze the right to new lawsuits under Title III for six months.
• Existing lawsuits continued nonetheless.
• Removed Cuba from the list of terrorism sponsors and eliminated the "restricted list."

Trump Lifts the Suspension (January 31, 2025)

• Formally invalidates Biden's measure via letter to Congress.
• New lawsuits are reactivated from that day forward.
• Maintains the line of sanctions against Cuba, aiming to pressure the regime.

Immediate Future

Additional lawsuits against companies operating on expropriated properties are expected. With no suspension in place, any potential foreign investor in Cuba faces immediate legal risks in the U.S.

In conclusion, the Trump administration's reversal of the previous administration's (Biden's) letter reinstates the full force of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, reopening the door to new lawsuits related to properties expropriated after 1959. This move reinforces a more rigid U.S. policy towards Cuba, with the potential to increase economic pressure on the regime and complicate foreign investments on the island.